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To be successfully competitive, state enterprises in China have recast themselves 
in the image of capitalist companies. The term “capitalist company” begs an 
important question, however, given that not all forms of capitalism are alike. 
Japanese and American-style firms, for example, take quite different approaches 
to many aspects of capitalist management. Our research at one state enterprise, a 
prosperous distillery, reveals that from the 1980s into the 2000s it instituted 
practices similar in many respects to the Japanese model.  
The distillery’s capacity to do so has depended upon its profitability. A 
substantial number of other state-sector manufacturing enterprises similarly have 
been profitable during recent decades. Much has been written about the 
admittedly very large number of state enterprises that could not adjust 
successfully to the introduction of a market economy, teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy, and in the 1990s dismissed very large numbers of employees.1 Some 
other state enterprises, such as in the textile and footwear industries, sought to 
adjust by driving their long-term workforce to labor for depressed wages under 
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worse conditions than in previous times.2 One of the terrible downsides of the 
economic reforms has been this sacking and exploitation of so many millions of 
workers. But it is also important to study state-owned firms that have managed to 
prosper throughout China’s economic boom3—including enterprises such as the 
distillery where employees have benefited.  
We spent a total of four months at the distillery between 2002 and the end of 
2004, during three extended research trips. It is not a “model” enterprise, and 
there was no effort by Chinese authorities to steer us to it. Instead, we gained 
access through a Chinese academic who sits on its board of directors. During the 
period of our stay, we were able to conduct well over a hundred unsupervised in-
depth interviews with five dozen of its employees, many of whom we met 
through our own devices. We spoke with them at length not only at the workplace 
but also in their homes. In May 2009 we updated our information through an 
interview with an employee conducted by our former research assistant and 
through recent articles about the distillery that are available on the web. 
The distillery, which employs about 2,000 staff and workers, was founded 
prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic, and was nationalized in the 
early 1950s. Distilling is an industry that relies upon heavy labor, and in both the 
Maoist era and today most of the employees have been only modestly educated 
and hold to a distinctly blue-collar identity. This is precisely the type of 
workforce that has fared poorly in some parts of the state-owned industrial sector 
during the post-Mao period of economic reform. But not here. Instead, the 
distillery’s healthy finances have enabled it to reshape the socialist work unit 
(danwei !") experience into a relationship with employees that resembles that 
of large Japanese corporations. Our interviewees insisted that many of the other 
state-owned and former state-owned enterprises in their city’s food- and drinks-
processing sector developed similar managerial practices during the reform period 
and have experienced similar workplace environments. It is a type of firm that has 
not previously been examined closely by foreign observers—a part of Chinese 
industrial society that warrants our attention.  
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Variants of Capitalism: Neo-liberal vs. Organization-Oriented 
Several comparative scholars have focused attention on the differences between 
two capitalist industrial models—market-oriented neo-liberal capitalism, 
exemplified by the United States and Britain, and a non-neoliberal, organization-
oriented capitalism, exemplified by Japan and Germany.4 It has been argued that 
corporate governance, sources of finance, management styles, remuneration 
systems, hirings and firings, the trade unions’ relations with management, and the 
“corporate culture” of firms all differ between these two models.  
In the Anglo–American model the enterprise looks more toward the 
enterprise’s share-market price, and accordingly tries to boost short-term profits, 
with a stress on accountability to shareholders, while preferring to treat the 
workforce in terms of a free labor market. The individual employee theoretically 
decides regularly whether to be on the move, seeking the highest price for his or 
her skill; and management cautiously weighs the returns from its training costs, 
knowing that an employee may well depart. Neither side feels particularly obliged 
to the other beyond the labor contract. 
In Japan and Germany, enterprises are relatively insulated from the stock 
market’s influence due to reliance on bank-based financing, allowing firms to 
focus on more long-range goals. Because firms in Japan and Germany are less 
beholden to stock market sentiment than in the American or British systems, they 
have a greater tendency to retain and reinvest profits, rather than distribute 
substantial dividends.  
Thinking more in the longer term, the large Japanese and German firms are 
considerably more inclined to provide employees with job security and a career 
pattern based on seniority. 5  One consequence is that the enterprise provides 
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extensive in-house training and apprenticeships in the expectation that employees 
will not subsequently move to other firms.6 
Especially in Japan, the employees’ long-term working career is taken directly 
into account in remuneration packages. In Japan’s large core enterprises, 
employees are not paid only according to their skill levels, but also in accord with 
criteria such as age and years of service. When compared to the Anglo–American 
model, this results in a relatively small gap in wages among employees of the 
same age and length of service. It also encourages a long-term paternalism that 
manifests itself, famously in Japan, in non-monetary benefits. Such benefits have 
included subsidized housing that creates enterprise-centered communities. 
Especially in the heyday of the Japanese system in the 1960s–80s, employee 
perquisites also included “welfare benefits paid … for transportation, canteen and 
other food services, medical, purchasing, and cultural and recreational facilities”.7 
To ensure that job security in a core enterprise can be guaranteed, the firm 
employs a corps of temporary workers, and they are the ones who get laid off 
during a business downturn instead of the permanent workforce. Also, commonly, 
part of the production gets subcontracted to small peripheral companies, and 
during downturns this production gets pulled back into the main firm to keep its 
otherwise excess employees occupied. 
These attributes of large Japanese firms continue to be witnessed during the 
crisis in the world economy that began in 2008. According to The Financial 
Times: 
Instead of mass layoffs or cuts in facilities, companies in Japan are cutting 
part-time staff. (Layoffs of full-time workers remain taboo.) They are also 
delaying or cancelling fewer new factories than elsewhere. One reason is 
that Japanese companies have war chests of cash built up during Japan’s 
recovery earlier this decade. Another is that, unlike in the United States, 
shareholders lack the power to demand that cash be paid out as 
dividends.8 
Given the mutual commitment to lifelong employment in the same enterprise, 
a Japanese enterprise in the core sector is envisioned as a community or, as the 
Japanese have often put it, as a company “family”.9 An effort is made to seem 
                                                                                                                          
For the majority of the Japanese workforce not in the core sector, the rate of job-mobility 
was about the same as in other industrialized countries. Solomon B. Levine, “Careers and 
Mobility in Japan’s Labor Markets”, in David W. Plath (ed.), Work and Lifecourse in 
Japan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 15-33. 
6
  Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve. 
7
  Robert E. Cole, Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971), p. 73. 
8
  The Financial Times, 12 December 2008, p. 12.  
9
  Rodney Clark, “The Company as Family: Historical Background”, in Daniel Okimoto and 
Thomas Rohlen (eds), Inside the Japanese System (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988), pp. 103-05. 
A CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISE UNDER THE REFORMS    5 
communal: supervisors and workers wear the same work clothes and share the 
same canteens at lunch. This ethos of an enterprise community is shared even by 
top executives. As noted by the Japan specialist Ronald Dore, “in Japanese 
firms … nobody gives a great deal of thought to owners … The president, the 
vice-presidents, and the large Board are treated as, and see themselves as, the 
elders of the enterprise community. Their primary concern is the reputation of the 
community and the welfare of its members …”10 All in all, it is not surprising that 
the Japanese firm supports a more consensual system of labor–management 
relations, compared to a more adversarial labor-relations system in the Anglo–
American neo-liberal model. 
Ronald Dore has drawn up a list showing the key attributes of an ideal-type 




The firm as entity The firm as instrument 
Quasi-community firm Company-law-conforming firm 
The firm as an aggregation of people The firm as a nexus of contracts 
Jinponshugiteki (human-capital-ist) Shihonshugiteki (money-capital-ist) 
Enduring relational transactions Limited contractual transactions 
Employee-sovereignty Shareholder-sovereignty 
Appealing to membership motivation Appealing to market motivation 
The scholars who study the contrasting Japanese–German and Anglo–
American capitalist systems have focused on the lock-in and path dependency 
effects of the countries’ prior developmental histories. Germany and Japan 
evolved out of political systems going back to the 19th century that were not 
liberal democracies. The states played a strong hand in economic development. 
Historically, Japan had consciously learned from the Germans. At each critical 
juncture in their histories, both systems adapted to new political and economic 
conditions, but always building on their existing institutional arrangements, 
accommodating the demands of labor in exchange for cooperation. War 
mobilizations particularly required a corporatist system. After World War II both 
countries came under American occupation, but they were still able to emerge 
with their industrial systems largely intact. For instance, the origin of today’s 
German institution of co-determination at the workplace between management 
and the works council can be traced to 1891 when workers’ committees 
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(Arbeiterausschüsse) with limited consultation rights were legally 
institutionalized.12 In Japan, what is known as the Japanese labor–management 
consultation system (roshi kuyogi-sei) was introduced in the 1920s and 
survived.13 Today, it is equivalent to a much weaker version of the German works 
council. In any event, the idea of consultation prevails in both of these national 
forms of organization-oriented capitalism. 
While the Japanese and German forms have distinct similarities they also 
exhibit distinctive differences. In Germany the national industrial unions are 
much better developed and collective bargaining often occurs at the regional level, 
and the welfare system is largely coordinated and administered at the national 
level. In Japan, collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise level, and the 
enterprise normally takes care of workers’ welfare. Looking back in time, 
historically the catch-up mentality of Japanese developmentalism encouraged a 
strong state to work in cooperation with capital and labor by way of a more 
enterprise-oriented system, with its attendant enterprise trade unionism, enterprise 
welfare-ism, and an enterprise envisioned in terms of a family or as a community. 
In the pages that follow, it will be seen that the Chinese state enterprise that 
we have studied more closely resembles the Japanese than the German example. 
Consequently, we will largely make references to Japan rather than Germany 
when discussing whether the distillery’s operations can be said to fall under the 
umbrella of organization-oriented capitalism. 
The Maoist Work Unit (Danwei) State-Oriented System  
In light of the fact that path-dependency effects have strongly influenced how the 
modern Japanese and German industrial systems operate, if we are to understand 
the course taken by the Chinese distillery during the post-Mao era we must first 
look back at its antecedent. What were the overall attributes of the Maoist 
industrial system and what circumstances prevailed at the distillery? 
The emergence of the Maoist system in the 1950s was itself the result of path-
dependent development based on industrial arrangements that arose during the 
Republican era under the Nationalist government. In the 1920s and 1930s, a 
newly established legal framework for industrial relations, along with state-
corporatist tendencies, heavy-handed state intervention, and paternalistic practices 
to curb a high labor turnover rate among skilled workers helped lay down the 
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preconditions for the socialist workplace (danwei) system.14 This was similar to 
Japan, where the modern industrial corporations of the Meiji era in the late 19th 
century provided housing and other perquisites to employees whose skills were in 
short supply, in order to induce them to remain with the firm over the long term.  
After the Communist Party came to power and nationalized factories in the 
1950s, it first endeavored to install a Soviet-style wage system based on skill 
rankings and output quotas, but soon reverted to a work-year seniority system, in 
part reflecting the expectations and pressures of older workers.15 The Chinese 
socialist danwei became not only a workplace but an all-encompassing work and 
residence community, which provided for the employees’ families’ everyday 
needs, pensions, jobs for employees’ children and so on. The enterprise trade 
union did not have any actual trade-union function, but rather served as the 
welfare department of management. Many aspects of this system resembled the 
Japanese system: practically no job mobility between firms, in-house training 
programs, wages based on a work-year seniority system, life-time employment 
security, the workplace serving as a community (including provision of 
accommodation) and so forth. 
Maoism espoused egalitarianism. With frugality and conformity imposed, 
everyone wore basically the same, ubiquitous, dull-colored garb. Facilities tended 
to be single-status, the pay system was monthly for all, and the distinction 
between staff and workers in a factory was not visibly marked. In government 
statistics, managers, office staff and blue-collar workers were (and still are) 
almost always referred to as zhigong (#$, staffworkers as one word), as if they 
were all one single category of working people, fudging the boundary between the 
groups.  
In some respects the Maoist industrial system possessed the features of a war 
economy, similar to Japan during World War II: planned, authoritarian, 
nationalistic and collectivistic. Individuals were asked to sacrifice for the common 
national cause during speed-up-production mass mobilization campaigns that 
swept the nation one after another.16 
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This Mao-era danwei system was not an “organization-oriented” system as 
exists in modern-day Japan or Germany. Rather, the Maoist industrial system was 
“state-oriented”, in that the socialist economy was centrally planned, with 
centrally-planned employment and remuneration systems. Neither the market nor 
the enterprise, but instead the Chinese state, became the ultimate decision-maker 
in the allocation of resources and living standards. This meant that employees 
could not look to the enterprise and its commercial success as the source of their 
welfare. Instead, their welfare explicitly depended upon state policy. 
In addition, the object of employee identification was different: it involved 
demands for loyalty to the Party-state, not to the enterprise organization. Whereas 
Japanese enterprises often have their own anthems, Chinese danweis sang songs 
of devotion to Chairman Mao. The distinction is an important one. In post-World 
War II Japan, the collective welfare of the enterprise has taken precedence over 
those of the state and the individual. (This is not “culturally” bound: in the pre-
World War II period, the interest of the state, personified in the Japanese emperor, 
prevailed over all other interests.) In Mao-era China, the highest levels of the 
polity went to great lengths to have all attention and loyalty directed toward the 
overriding will of the Party-state and, at the height of Mao’s personality cult, the 
will of the deified leader. The political system manufactured pejorative labels 
such as “individualism” and “economism” (a term that was used to decry the 
danwei taking its own initiative to grant workers higher pay and greater benefits 
than the Party-state sanctioned). At the height of political campaigns, these labels 
could invite political penalties and purges. Political control was one of the 
danwei’s functions, and as a result the Maoist workplace did not enjoy 
harmonious relations but instead bred mutual suspicion and mistrust.17  Under 
such circumstances the Maoist danwei squandered opportunities to play a 
cohesive social role similar to the Japanese workplace.  
The distillery exemplified this pattern. In the Maoist period, its workforce 
suffered from a level of poverty that was imposed by state policy. Government 
regulations stipulated that the employees at different types of factories received 
different levels of benefits, and the distillery, as a city-level enterprise under the 
supervision of the lowly foodstuffs bureau, sat low on the administrative ladder. It 
also used very old-fashioned, labor-intensive liquor-making methods, and in the 
Marxist worldview this type of work did not have the prestige of modern heavy 
industry. Thus, during the period of Mao’s rule, government policy directed that 
the distillery’s salaries and perquisites were to be set at a noticeably poorer level 
than in high-status, prioritized industries such as steel production. Elderly 
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interviewees recall subsistence living standards and extremely crowded and run-
down enterprise housing. Three generations of a family crammed into one or two 
small, dank rooms, without any kitchen space or nearby tap water. But our elderly 
interviewees say that at the time they had not felt disgruntled or disillusioned, 
since many of them could remember an even more impoverished standard of 
living before Communist rule. Though their daily lives were difficult, their basic 
needs were met through food and cloth rations, they enjoyed job security and 
could look forward to modest pensions. Throughout, they largely accepted the 
new Party-led system. Nevertheless, the workers became discomforted by never-
ending rounds of “political study” and by a succession of campaigns that often 
puzzled them, sometimes worried them, very frequently bored them, and only 
occasionally aroused any enthusiasm. Notably, in all of these political-study 
sessions and campaigns, what was supposed to inspire conscientious work was 
not loyalty to the distillery but rather devotion to the national revolution and Party.  
In line with Maoist ideology, within the distillery an egalitarian ethos 
prevailed in terms both of salary patterns and the distinction between blue- and 
white-collar work. A retired technician recalls,  
In the 1970s, the distillery director had to labor for at least one month 
each year … The shopfloor head was considered like an ordinary worker 
in the sense that everyone labored. Later, under Deng, when the shopfloor 
head and the foremen stopped doing manual work it was a big change in 
status … There was a sense of everyone being almost the same materially 
[under Mao], since their wages were about the same. The monthly bonus 
was no more than a few yuan. The shopfloor head got 4 yuan. Those who 
got the least had 3 yuan. 
In these respects, even if driven by ideological reasons, the distillery under 
Mao maintained practices somewhat similar to those of Japanese enterprises. As 
noted in a well-known study of the 1970s on the workforces of large Japanese 
companies, “An almost universal feeling among the workers in the [Japanese] 
shop was that foremen were workers and not management representatives … This 
view was strengthened further in the postwar period with the spread of egalitarian 
values and the reduction of wage differentials”.18  
The Post-Mao, Organization-Oriented System at the Distillery 
Under the command economy of Mao’s time, the distillery leaders had to focus 
on meeting the targets of the Party-state and the foodstuffs bureau, and they had 
almost no scope to be benefactors of their workforce, since they had no leeway to 
decide on the salary scale and living conditions. But after Mao’s death, under the 
economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, this changed. 
Starting in the 1980s, there was no longer Maoist-style political study or 
strong political controls over the managers and workforce, and the distillery 
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managers were no longer under strong command-economy pressures to serve the 
interests of the state. Reforms to industry in the 1980s allowed enterprises to 
retain much of their profits and gave far greater discretion to management on how 
to spend the funds. The distillery benefited greatly from this. At that time, 
officials throughout China were increasingly lavish with expensive liquor when 
banqueting at public expense, and the distillery was permitted to sell its output at 
high market prices. Many blue-collar employees (including the foremen) felt that 
a debt was owed to them. They believed that, since they had put in many years of 
loyal service in poverty, the distillery leadership was in turn duty-bound to be 
paternalistic and to share out the enterprise’s new-found profits. 19 The 
management agreed. The distillery began to morph into a decidedly organization-
oriented enterprise, in which loyalties and corporate strategies were focused not 
on a controlling state but rather on the welfare of the organization’s membership. 
Ronald Dore’s description of the Japanese system quoted earlier in this paper 
came to fit the distillery: under the new economic dispensation, the heads of the 
distillery saw themselves (borrowing Dore’s words) as the paternalistic “elders 
of the enterprise community” and “their primary concern was for the reputation 
of the community and the welfare of its members”. They were amenable to 
putting in place a series of policies that greatly favored the employees’ interests. 
This was a widespread phenomenon in China in the 1980s. As a recent study 
observes, “it became the common expectation that managers would secure the 
retained funds and use them to upgrade workers’ living standards. The better 
they fulfilled the expectation, the more legitimacy and popularity they would 
gain as danwei leaders”.20 
Bestowal of benefits 
With no pressures to provide dividends to any “owners”, the distillery used a 
good part of its after-tax profits to expand greatly the range of benefits available 
to employees up into the 2000s. Although employees’ salaries were not at all high, 
at less than 2,000 yuan a month in the early 2000s, this was supplemented by a 
stream of monetary and non-monetary benefits. For instance, the distillery 
bestowed gifts and extra money on them at all national holidays, as well as a gift 
at the end of the year of some 800 yuan in cash, disbursed equally to each 
employee. The company’s generosity in the early 2000s also extended to full 
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medical coverage (the enterprise even paid 100,000 yuan to cover kidney 
transplants for two employees) and free life insurance. There was also a wide 
range of other perquisites large and small (a range even broader than the Japanese 
system in its heyday). These included a small heating subsidy every year for each 
distillery employee’s household (a carry-over from Mao’s day), a generous lunch 
subsidy in cash, and a subsidy for “reading materials”. The diverse monetary and 
non-monetary benefits have enabled employees to accumulate savings, and thus 
they could begin to make major purchases. As of 2003–04, an issue at the 
enterprise’s housing estates was a shortage of parking spaces. Even some of the 
blue-collar families were pooling the earnings of several family members to 
purchase cars. 
In the Anglo–American system, the level of remuneration across different 
companies in the same industry is similar for a given level of skills, as determined 
by the labor market (and whether there is a union at the workplace). Workers are 
not expected to have a claim on profits: a blue-collar employee of a profitable 
firm does not earn twice what a similar worker in a less-profitable firm earns. Not 
so in China today, where “workers who are employed in a highly profitable 
danwei earn as much as 2.5 times those who are otherwise comparable but 
employed in a relatively unprofitable danwei”.21  
This same distinction extends to retirees. In light of the distillery’s career-long 
employment of staff and its self-image as a paternalistic family, the enterprise 
management’s sense of responsibility extended to showing benevolence toward 
retirees, as much as to its current workforce. Retirees were entitled to many of the 
same gifts and subsidies. During the period of our research, all of the retirees were 
feted by the distillery head at a restaurant banquet, at which the leader thanked 
them for the years of hard work they had given to the enterprise. When we were at 
the distillery in 2003, the retirees were ceremoniously each handed a red envelope 
at the banquet containing a New Year gift of 300 yuan, along with apologies that 
the amount was 100 yuan less than the previous year, which had been more 
profitable for the company. In another show of appreciation, all of the retirees and 
their spouses were given free overnight sightseeing tours every year to famous 
scenic landmarks. 
The enterprise was not an anomaly among state enterprises in providing such 
benefits. Interviewees said that many of the other state-owned enterprises in their 
city’s food-processing industry have sought to look after the interests of both their 
workforce and retirees in a similarly paternalistic fashion. 
Good housing has stood near the top of employees’ wish lists. The distillery 
responded in the mid-1990s by constructing two large housing developments 
containing very decent apartments, which were sold off to the workforce at a large 
discount. In line with the enterprise’s stress on work-year seniority, those who 
had served the distillery the longest were given the first pick of apartments, and 
                                                 
21
  Yu Xie and Xiaogang Wu, “Danwei Profitability and Earnings Inequality”, p. 579. 
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were offered a 2 per cent reduction below the cost of construction for every year 
they had worked there. The greatest beneficiaries were largely older blue-collar 
workers. Some of them, with 40 years of work under their belts, obtained large 
apartments for only 20 per cent of the construction cost.22  The managers and 
workers lived together in these new housing estates: that is, in a tight-knit 
enterprise residential community. A nursery school and kindergarten were 
provided there at company expense. The distillery also undertook to construct a 
small building at the housing compounds to house a retirees’ social club, and 
covered all of the running costs. As in Japan, the enterprise’s responsibilities have 
extended outside work hours and well beyond the factory premises. 
The enterprise trade union organized the retirees’ social club and dispensed 
many of the other benefits on behalf of the distillery. In Japan, too, the union has 
been “closely integrated into company administration”.23 A difference is that in 
Japan the union also normally serves genuine functions of worker representation. 
At the distillery, in contrast, the enterprise union officials are all appointed by 
management, and the heads of the production workshops sometimes serve 
concurrently as the union officers. One such dual-role occupant explained to us 
her union responsibility: “It involves paying attention to who has hardships and 
going to help them with money or going to hospital to visit them”. The deputy 
director of the distillery union even observed that “when couples have a marital 
problem we come in to mediate”. 
Alongside the union’s solicitous welfare function, the distillery’s managers 
were personally expected to regularly undertake duties to express their own 
paternalistic concern. While a union officer helped to organize funerals on behalf 
of grieving families, the top managers took the lead in performing a formal 
mourning role as heads of the enterprise family. During the period we were 
conducting research at the distillery, one of the young salesmen died in a car crash, 
and the deputy head of the union noted: 
                                                 
22
  Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “The Internal Politics of an Urban Chinese Work 
Community: A Case Study of Employee Influence on Decision-Making at a State Owned 
Factory”, The China Journal, No. 52 (July 2004), pp. 1-24. The distillery was not alone in 
this. A recent book which praises Wuhan Steel (Wugang) for its profitable corporate 
reform initiatives observes that in 1998, “Wugang started an aggressive project to develop 
a self-contained landscaped complex with 10,000 apartment units for its workers. When 
the project was completed in 2002, the units were apparently sold to employees at cost; 
that is, at about one-third to half of the market value. Wugang also provided some long-
service employees with additional discounts … For those employees who rented units, 
they were charged similarly at about one-third of the market rate, with the rental 
agreement continuing into retirement (p. 187) … In the minds of Wugang’s managers, 
providing adequate social welfare appears to remain a priority” (p. 190). John Hassard, 
Jackie Sheehan, Meixiang Zhou, Jan Terpstra-Tong and Jonathan Morris, Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform: From Marx to the Market (London: Routledge, 2007), italics added.  
23
  Robert E. Cole, Japanese Blue Collar, p. 98. 
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All of the members of the top leadership will go to the funeral. All of 
them. The family will be terribly moved by this. And people in the sales 
department get to see how the leadership cares, and this makes them feel 
good and it increases their work incentive … Our factory is very good in 
taking care of deaths. Each one gets burial expenses averaging some 
10,000 yuan. The amount we give varies with length of service. 
The notion that a manager’s duties include solicitous attendance at 
employees’ funerals will be familiar to Japan specialists. 
Life-time employment, in-house training and work-year pay  
As in Japan and Germany, an enterprise like the distillery maintains a special 
relationship with a bank and relies upon bank loans for much of its long-term 
investments, to a far greater extent than in America or Britain. This reliance on 
banks is commonplace today. A 2008 article observes, “Japan and Germany rely 
mostly on bank finance for corporate financing needs, whereas Anglo-Saxon 
countries resort to markets … The Chinese financial system … can be 
characterized as bank-oriented”. 24  In addition, with less concern about stock-
market prices and less worry about providing a regular high stream of dividend 
distributions, there has often been a high rate of reinvestment of profits, looking 
to the longer term. Both of these phenomena were evident at the distillery during 
the period of our research. 
Parallel to this focus, the distillery, as in Japan and Germany, presumed that 
employees would spend their careers within the firm. Also similar to Japan and 
Germany, this has provided the basis for an extensive program of in-house job 
training. This had been the case during the Maoist period, when a traditional 
apprenticeship system was retained at the distillery, and it remained the case in 
the early 2000s. Young blue-collar recruits still learned the trade as apprentices 
for three years under a “master” (shifu) worker, all the while earning only partial 
pay. In 2004 one of the workers observed, “When the apprentice graduates, he has 
to invite all his workmates for a good meal at which it’s formally recognized he’s 
been brought up by the master worker”. It cements a life-long formal bond, re-
celebrated each year at Chinese New Year and on the master worker’s birthday, 
when all his former apprentices visit his home bearing small gifts. The distillery, 
in short, retains an organizational framework for job training that mimics father–
son relationships within the enterprise “family”. 
Similar to Japan, as of the first half of the 2000 decade wages and bonuses at 
the distillery rewarded (i) length of service and promoted (ii) egalitarianism and 
(iii) work-group solidarity. To a degree that is truly extraordinary by international 
standards, in all three of these aspects the principle got carried out far beyond 
                                                 
24
  Yasushi Suzuki, Md. Dulal Miah and Jinyi Yuan, “China’s Non-Performing Loan Crisis: 
The Role of Economic Rents”, Asia–Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 22, No. 1 (May 
2008), p. 57. 
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what occurs in the Japanese wage system. A woman in late middle age observed 
to us in 2003,  
I’m now considered a managerial cadre, but my income is about the same 
as an ordinary worker who entered the distillery at about the same time I 
did. University graduates who entered more recently don’t have as high 
an income, and they earn only a few tens of yuan more per month than the 
workers who arrived at the same time as themselves. My own base wage 
now is about 600 yuan, which is 80 to 90 yuan higher than someone 
who’s been here five years. We also all get a monthly bonus, which is the 
largest component of my income. It varies according to the distillery’s 
profits. Mine comes to about 800–900 yuan a month, and sometimes over 
1000 yuan. I work in an administrative department, so my bonus amounts 
to exactly 80 per cent of the average of the blue-collar workshop workers’ 
bonus. A workshop head’s is 1.2 times one of his worker’s, up to the top 
for a manager, who gets a bonus that’s 1.3 times a worker’s. But if we 
privatize, the gap is sure to widen. 
Though this payment system may seem in line with Maoist ideology—with 
blue-collar workers, for instance, earning as much as or more than this managerial 
cadre—the system was not a direct carryover from Maoist times. In fact, in the 
earlier period of economic reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s, the remuneration 
and bonus systems at the distillery rewarded rank and effort more than in the first 
half of the 2000s. This can be seen in both the annual and monthly bonuses. 
Earlier, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the large annual bonus provided at the 
Chinese New Year varied according to the level of an employee’s post, but by the 
early 2000s every distillery employee received precisely the same amount. So, too, 
all of the workers in the same workshop came to receive exactly the same amount 
as their mates as a monthly bonus, even though the bonus initially was supposed 
to serve as an individual incentive system. A workshop head told us in 2003, 
“Today, these monthly bonuses are basically a case of ‘everyone eating from the 
big rice pot’ (da guo fan ???), whereas earlier there was a distinction made as 
to how much you worked”. The pressures and ethos from within the work 
community had had a leveling effect, more so than in Japan. The components in 
the remuneration package, though, were similar to Japan’s. The wage systems in 
both Japan and an enterprise such as the distillery contained a base-wage 
component tied to work-year seniority,25 plus a substantial bonus system for all 
employees.26 
                                                 
25  For the first two decades after World War II, the Japanese wage structure was very 
strongly work-year related. A job-level supplement in the Japanese system was a more 
recent innovation of the Sixties. Bernard Karsh and Robert E. Cole, “Industrialization and 
the Convergence Hypothesis: Some Aspects of Contemporary Japan”, Journal of Social 
Issues, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1968), pp. 45-63; Ronald Dore, British Factory—Japanese Factory, 
p. 104. 
26  In the Japanese system, during the 1970s a semi-annual bonus in large firms comprised 26 
per cent of the year’s income, rising to an average for all firms of 35 per cent in 1990 
A CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISE UNDER THE REFORMS    15 
Much as in Maoist times, in the early 2000s the distillery’s commitment to 
employees extended to their families, and so the distillery gave priority to hiring 
the children of employees. Only if there were not enough qualified applicants 
from among the children did the company recruit new workers from outside. 
The distillery’s prestige brands sell well—at up to 1,000 yuan (US$180) a 
bottle for the very finest—and thus the enterprise runs at a profit. But starting in 
the late 1990s the market for cheaper liquors began suffering and production had 
to be cut back. As a consequence the distillery was now employing a larger 
workforce than it needed. Yet as of 2002–03 no one had been laid off,27 in an 
enterprise commitment to try to maintain lifetime employment, and the levels of 
the blue-collar employees’ salaries were all maintained. The enterprise began 
adjusting to the downturn through a strategy of investing in new product lines, 
such as plans to produce plum wines, rather than downsizing. The distillery, like a 
core Japanese firm, also had two other ways to retain full employment for its 
permanent staff. First, during the prior period of boom demand for inexpensive 
liquor, the distillery had begun sub-contracting production to nearby external 
suppliers rather than attempt to expand its own production rapidly. It thus could 
choose to stop orders when the market demand for liquor contracted, while 
retaining the production at its own distillery. Second, again akin to Japan’s core 
firms, the distillery hired a group of temporary workers from the countryside 
during the boom years of the 1990s, who could be let go during periods of 
contraction. This latter strategy, however, became intertwined with the distillery’s 
desire to provide employment to the kin of its permanent workforce. All of the 
hundreds of temporary workers who got hired were rural relatives of employees—
cousins and second cousins—and by the early 1990s they had been there long 
enough to seem like semi-members of the corporate community. The distillery 
ethos made it unseemly to dismiss them, and so they continued to labor in the 
                                                                                                                          
(Kazutoshi Koshiro, “Development of Collective Bargaining in Post-War Japan”, in 
T. Shirai [ed.], Contemporary Industrial Relations in Japan [Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983], pp. 205-57; Richard Curtain, “Recent Developments in Human 
Resource Management Practices in Japanese Enterprises” [unpublished manuscript, 
Canberra, Australia, 1993]). Robert E. Cole notes, “In the past, the semi-annual bonuses 
were viewed as a sign of management generosity and paternalism”, but by the 1960s 
workers considered it “not a gift but a right to which they were entitled” (Japanese Blue 
Collar, p. 176). 
27
  A statistical analysis of a survey of state enterprises, conducted by Jean Oi up through 
2004, showed that a majority of the enterprises that restructured have also been averse to 
laying off workers. (Our thanks to Jean Oi for this information.) Other findings from her 
survey are discussed in Jean Oi, “Patterns of Corporate Restructuring in China: Political 
Constraints on Privatization”, The China Journal, No. 53 (January 2005), pp. 115-36. In a 
vein similar to the distillery, a study of profitable Wuhan Steel (Wugang) notes that 
surplus workers retained their employment by being placed into subsidiary non-steel 
enterprises which Wugang established. As a result, “overall, there have been relatively 
few direct lay-offs over the years at Wugang”. John Hassard, Jackie Sheehan, Meixiang 
Zhou, Jan Terpstra-Tong and Jonathan Morris, Chinese State Enterprise Reform, p. 187.  
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workshops eight hours a day at full pay. The astonishing result was that, during 
the 2001–03 downturn, the permanent workers who produced the cheaper brands 
of liquor were given a much-reduced workload and were told to come to work for 
only four hours a day or alternatively, to save them the effort of commuting, to 
come to work only every second day—at full pay. 
Workplace Consultation 
State-owned enterprises are all supposed to have Staff and Workers 
Representative Congresses (Zhigong daibiao dahui #$()%*), which are 
somewhat similar in form to works councils in Germany and Japan. The Chinese 
congress and its legally-sanctioned representation on the supervisory board of 
publicly owned firms goes against the thrust of the Anglo–American shareholder-
oriented model, and is instead in line with the organization-oriented framework.  
The staff and workers’ congresses derive historically from the workers’ 
councils of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The best-known of the workers’ 
councils were in Yugoslavia, where, unlike the rest of the Communist Party-led 
countries, they developed major decision-making powers. In China, in contrast, 
after the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 they became mere window-dressing and 
eventually atrophied. After Mao’s death they were revived under Deng Xiaoping. 
A State Council proclamation in 1980 announced that they should be established 
in all enterprises, to provide some offsetting leverage vis-à-vis the new 
discretionary powers that were being proposed for managers.28 A congress holds 
the power—at least on paper—to examine the enterprise’s major strategic policies, 
especially those related to the fate of the enterprise, such as ownership 
restructuring, merging with other firms or declaration of bankruptcy.29 It is also 
supposed to have the power to reject the appointment of a new manager or to 
recommend the dismissal of a sitting one, and to have a say on wages, on 
industrial safety issues, on employee welfare programs and on housing.30 
                                                 
28
  This was in the State Council-issued “Report on the Pioneering Program on the Expansion 
of Enterprise Autonomy and Plans for the Future”, 1980. A former Chinese trade-union 
researcher has called the 1980s the “golden age” of the staff and workers representative 
congresses. Jiang Kelin, “Gonghui yu dang-guojia de chongtu: bashi niandai yilai de 
Zhongguo gonghui gaige” (The Conflicts between the Trade Union and the Party-state: 
The Reform of the Chinese Trade Union in the Eighties), Xianggang shehui kexue xuebao 
(Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences), No. 8 (Autumn 1996), p. 128.  
29
  These rights were codified in Article 52 of the Enterprise Law of 1988. 
30
  The legal status of the Staff and Workers’ Representatives Congress (SWRC) was 
guaranteed in the Enterprise Law passed in 1988 after the national union federation 
(ACFTU) lobbied to have this inserted into the law, but the Enterprise Law was applicable 
only to state and collective enterprises (Jiang Kelin, “Gonghui yu dang-guojia de 
chongtu”). Once enterprises were transformed into other types of ownership they came 
under the Company Law passed in 1993. In the newly revised Company Law that went 
into effect as of January 2006, the ACFTU succeeded in strengthening the legal powers of 
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In reality, few of these enterprise staff and workers congresses have ever had 
the wherewithal to exercise most of their putative rights. In fact, during the course 
of the 1990s, fewer of them were called into session, as the power of managers 
expanded and as more state enterprises plunged into the red, slashed employee 
benefits and downsized their workforces. But the congress continued to exist, 
even if inactively, at 92 per cent of the state enterprises surveyed in 1997,31 and in 
some parts of China they remained active. In 1998 in Liaoning Province, more 
than 2,300 managers of state-owned enterprises were dismissed or demoted after 
failing to obtain the necessary 60 per cent of the votes from their enterprise’s 
congress.32 At some enterprises where management is corrupt, members of the 
congresses have taken matters into their own hands, calling themselves into 
session in attempts to forestall the sale of enterprise assets, to block the 
enterprise’s privatization or even to dismiss the managers.33 At one such factory, 
rebellious congress members declared the factory a “family compound” (jia yuan 
+,) that they were defending against “corrupt elements”.34  
At a large number of state enterprises that have maintained good 
management–employee relations, the congresses have continued to meet once or 
twice each year, and they are reported to have some influence vis-à-vis employee 
welfare policies, housing, and occupational health and safety.35 On many other 
                                                                                                                          
the SWRC at state enterprises and extending its legal, though not mandatory, existence to 
enterprises that are not state-owned or dominated by state shares. 
31
  The figure of 92 per cent was derived by Xiaoyang Zhu and Anita Chan from the raw data 
of a large nationwide survey sponsored by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in 
1997. Xiaoyang Zhu and Anita Chan, “The Institutionalization of Workers’ Articulated 
Interests”, Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2005), pp. 6-33. 
32
  China News Digest, 1 June 1998, citing an article in China Daily. In the same year, in the 
city of Tianjin 660 state-enterprise managers were sacked and another 1,550 enterprise 
officials were demoted or transferred after receiving less than 50 per cent support in a 
congress vote of confidence. Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), 10 April 1998. 
33
  A much-publicized case in the Chinese news media was a paper mill in the city of 
Zhengzhou, where workers themselves convened a congress to gain control of the mill 
from corrupt management, after the workers discovered that the managers were asset-
stripping and enriching themselves in the process. The struggle lasted a few years, and in 
the end the workers got back their factory, despite an ambivalent, wavering attitude taken 
by the local government. A local government official has admitted that, once this case set 
a precedent, some 20 other such cases erupted in Zhengzhou over the following several 
years. On this Zhengzhou case, see Xiaoyang Zhu, “‘Misreading’ of the Law and 
‘Imagined Home’ in Z Factory”, and Tong Xin, “The Cultural Basis of Workers’ 
Collective Action in a Transitional State-Owned Enterprise During a Time of Transition”, 
both in Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 3-41, pp. 42-
70; also Feng Chen, “Privatization and its Discontents in Chinese Factories”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 185 (March 2006), pp. 42-60. 
34
  Xiaoyang Zhu, “‘Misreading’ of the Law”. 
35
  This is a finding of the survey analysis by Xiaoyang Zhu and Anita Chan, “The 
Institutionalization of Workers’ Articulated Interests”. 
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policy issues, congress representatives at the distillery have felt that they are out 
of their depth. A congress was convened there about once a year during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, but these meetings normally did not have any effect on the 
management’s plans. As an interviewee explained, 
At ordinary times, for things not considered particularly important to 
people, congress members just let the leadership get on with it. The 
congress sessions let people hear a bit about policies and express their 
opinions, even though the opinions were not very useful, since the lower 
levels normally need to listen to the upper levels. Ordinary workers don’t 
know the entire situation, after all; they only know their own patch. This 
makes most congress meetings formalistic. But when there’s a serious 
matter at stake, in a case like the distribution of new apartments in 1994, 
which appealed to the direct interests of the staff and workers, then the 
representatives want to express their opinions. 
The staff and workers representative congress decided that the best 
apartments, at the lowest price, were to be sold to the employees who had worked 
there the longest, almost all of whom were blue-collar workers.36 
Debating the Japanese and American Models 
The distillery moved in the direction of the organization-oriented model for 
reasons intrinsic to its own circumstances. Even if the Japanese/German model 
did not exist internationally as an example of successful capitalism, it is highly 
likely that the distillery would have taken the path it did. The question arises, 
though: were the Chinese aware of the similarities in many of the practices of a 
Japanese core enterprise and those that were developing at Chinese enterprises 
like the distillery? In fact, it was a matter for considerable discussion in China, 
and possibly helped justify, in the eyes of Chinese policy-makers, the course 
taken by enterprises kindred to the distillery. 
From the early 1980s up through the early 1990s, Chinese authors who 
specialized in industrial policy-making debated the relative value of the 
contrasting Japanese and Anglo–American corporate models, and up through 
the early 1990s they exhibited more interest in the Japanese system. At the time, 
Japan’s industrial surge was still being referred to around the world as an 
“economic miracle”. So shifting China’s state-owned enterprises in the direction 
of the Japanese model seemed a means to achieve efficient production and 
technological progress while avoiding what were considered to be undesirable 
aspects of market capitalist organization. We have looked through all of the 
issues for the period between 1980 and 1990 of the Chinese journal Industrial 
Enterprise Management (Gongye qiye guanli $-.-/0), and 202 articles 
were published in it about Japanese enterprises compared to only 122 articles 
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  Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “The Internal Politics of an Urban Chinese Work 
Community”, pp. 12-14. 
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regarding American enterprises. 37  There was extensive discussion about 
creating an “enterprise culture” (qiye wenhua .-12 ) at the Chinese 
workplace, an expression borrowed from Japanese, where it refers to a 
corporation’s efforts to create a harmonious collectivist work environment and a 
sense of co 38rporate loyalty.  
                                                
In the latter half of the 1980s, the distillery was directed to send one of its 
personnel to receive training organized by the city government in how to 
implement an explicitly Japanese-style system of Total Quality Control (TQC) at 
the distillery. He recalls what he learned:  
In 1987, all of China was studying Japan’s TQC. There were two schools 
of thought about management. One school saw people as good, and 
Japan’s TQC essentially emerged from this perspective, which was to 
stimulate people’s feelings of self-respect and of pride in their 
achievements. The other school of thought saw human nature as 
intrinsically bad, and that was exemplified by Taylorism, in which you 
needed to use every kind of system of regulations to manage workers, 
with disciplinary penalties. At that time China turned toward Japan’s type 
of thinking and so turned toward the use of TQC. 
But the central government’s preferences began shifting progressively away 
from such thinking from the early to mid-1990s onward. The Japanese model was 
coming under serious challenge in Japan itself during the 1990s, at a time when 
the economy was faltering. Most large Japanese firms resisted changing the model 
significantly during the 1990s and kept their permanent workforces largely 
intact;39 but starting in the 2000s major Japanese companies have increasingly 
pushed in the direction of American-style business practices, focusing on share-
market values, disbursing large executive bonuses and stock options, and showing 
reduced attention to the interests of employees.40 (Whether the recent melt-downs 
 
37
  On this interest in Japanese enterprise management techniques, see also Glen Lewis and 
Wanning Sun, “Discourses about ‘Learning from Japan’ in Post-1979 Mainland Chinese 
Management Journals”, Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 63-76. 
38
  An analysis of the term qiye wenhua that is quite different to ours is contained in Colin 
Hawes, “Representing Corporate Culture in China: Official, Academic and Corporate 
Perspectives”, The China Journal, No. 59 (January 2008). 
39
  Kathleen Thelen and Ikuo Kume, “The Future of Nationally Embedded Capitalism: 
Industrial Relations in Germany and Japan”, and Steven K. Vogel, “The Re-Organization 
of Organized Capitalism: How the German and Japanese Models are Shaping their Own 
Transformations”, both in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck (eds), The End of 
Diversity?, pp. 194 and 316-7; also Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism, pp. 104-10. 
The Japanese system even demonstrated considerable resilience to the penetration of the 
Anglo–American model in Japanese companies recently acquired by foreign capital. 
George Olcott, “The Impact of Foreign Ownership and Control on Japanese 
Organisations”, PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2005. 
40
  Personal communication from Ronald Dore, May 2009. 
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and discrediting of management practices in the Anglo–American banking and 
auto industries will cause any rethinking in Japan is, as yet, an open question.)  
In China, where economists schooled in America have helped set the tone in 
government think-tanks, a strong advocacy group emerged in the 1990s in favor 
of abandoning the elements of Chinese enterprises that are in accord with the 
Japanese model and of shifting instead wholeheartedly in the direction of 
American-style firms. Such thinking permeated many of the policy 
recommendations and directives that the distillery received from the government 
during the late 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. These sought to initiate a 
shift away from life-time employment through the inauguration of fixed-term 
contracts, insisted that state enterprises dissociate themselves from employees’ 
housing and other non-workplace benefits, and transferred some other welfare 
functions, such as responsibility for pensions and medical coverage, from the 
workplace to the government. All of these measures were supposed to draw the 
Chinese system more towards the Anglo–American model.  
Nonetheless, the government has not accepted the Anglo–American model 
lock, stock and barrel.41  As one example, in 1996 the government decided to 
experiment with the “main bank” (zhuban yinhang 3456) system borrowed 
from Japanese corporate governance. A state enterprise or state-dominated 
shareholding corporation was to be linked to a bank that was to be responsible for 
its financing and that would simultaneously monitor its performance.42 When the 
distillery built a large compound of new factory buildings in 1997 to quadruple its 
production capacity, it turned entirely to its partnered bank, similar to the ongoing 
relationship between banks and German and Japanese firms, instead of relying on 
the stock market for new capital. As a second example, the government passed a 
new contract law in 2007 that re-introduces greater job security and indeed tenure 
after ten years of employment.  
In the toing and froing at the national level between policies that favored the 
Anglo–American system and those that favored the organization-oriented model, 
the distillery implemented the former types of policies reluctantly and with delays, 
and quietly provided extra coverage to employees wherever the new program 
provided less favorable terms than the enterprise had. This was evident with the 
government’s decisions to remove responsibility for pensions and medical 
coverage from the hands of workplaces. The government acted because many of 
the state enterprises were no longer in a financial position to provide these, but the 
distillery was generously providing both types. The distillery’s union chair 
therefore noted that when the government took over medical coverage at the 
distillery in 2003, “Workers were worried about it, so we decided to add an extra 
160 yuan a month to their pay to compensate. The proposal was to add an equal 
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  On Kit Tam, The Development of Corporate Governance in China (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1999), p. 24. 
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  On Kit Tam, “Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Enterprises”, Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 91, 93-94. 
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amount for everyone. There was a lot of discussion and in the end it was changed 
to a system based on how many years you’d been with the enterprise.” 
Similarly, old-age pensions had until recently derived entirely from the 
distillery’s own budget, but the government in 2003 took over the payment of 
pensions.43 Again, the new scheme benefited the employees of a lot of other state 
enterprises, but it was not popular among the distillery’s employees and retirees. 
They preferred the warm relationship that came with being dependants of their 
distillery, rather than having to deal with an impersonal government pension 
office. The 70-year-old head of the retirees’ Party group told us early in 2003, 
“Some retirees fear that once their pensions come from the government and not 
from our enterprise, the enterprise won’t care for us. I tell them that’s not possible, 
the enterprise will still be concerned about (guanxin 78 ) us, it will still 
distribute gifts to us.” 
Privatizing the Enterprise 
Generally, the largest profitable enterprises remain today under direct public 
ownership, control and direction under a central government policy to retain the 
large and release the small (zhua da, fang xiao 9%:;<). In line with this 
policy, starting in the latter part of the 1990s and accelerating in the early 2000s, 
great numbers of the smaller state enterprises have been restructured, marketized 
and converted into listed shareholding corporations—though sometimes with a 
majority share of state ownership.44 As a result, as of 2007 only 20,680 industrial 
firms were state-owned or majority-controlled, and of these only 10,074 industrial 
enterprises remained entirely state-owned.45 The other, smaller enterprises have 
been entirely or largely privatized, often through management buyouts or 
management–employee buyouts or as joint ventures with foreign investors. 
Nevertheless, a portion of these privatized state enterprises have retained the 
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attributes of a state enterprise in terms of management style, labor relations and 
employee benefits.46 
In 2003, in response to the central government’s program, the distillery 
undertook an MBO (management buy-out of the company’s assets). Such buy-
outs were becoming increasingly common, to the point that the headline in the 
city’s newspaper in January 2003 proclaiming the distillery’s imminent 
privatization simply used those three English letters “MBO” instead of the 
equivalent Chinese characters, as if most newspaper readers would instantly 
recognize the English-language acronym for a management buy-out. 
To make the MBO seem more palatable, it was in the form of an EMBO 
(employee–management buy-out). In reality, though, the ordinary employees 
were restricted to a maximum of only 13 per cent of the enterprise’s shares (we 
were told that this upper limit of 13 per cent was imposed by high-level 
regulations), and this amount was pulled out of their pension funds. The 
enterprise trade union head (who is appointed by the distillery’s management) 
would represent their shares on the board of directors. The top 28 managers 
acquired the great bulk of all the shares at an artificially low price, making use of 
a massive bank loan. The deputy director of the distillery, who oversaw the 
buyout, and who seems to us to have the least empathy of any of the managers 
toward the employees, used the fig leaf of the EMBO to justify what was 
essentially a management buyout—mouthing phrases like “enterprise culture” and 
“family” that China had borrowed from the Japanese model. He told us, 
If the state sold the property to foreign or domestic capitalists, our corps 
of employees would feel threatened, because our enterprise culture is not 
the same as other enterprises’. Our people feel the distillery is their family, 
a family created by them. The enterprise’s national reputation was created 
by them. So the state, in order to stabilize the feelings of the staff and 
workers, decided not to sell it to outsiders. The employees would be 
angry, and this would affect production. It was decided to persuade the 
employees to raise the capital themselves to buy shares from the state, to 
buy what they themselves had created. 
In order officially to go forward with the MBO, a Staff and Workers 
Representative Congress meeting was called into session in mid-2003 to approve 
it. But the meeting was controlled from above. Documents were handed out, and a 
report on the privatization proposal was read out, but the procedures were so 
complex that the congress members felt out of their depth and said little. They 
trusted the general manager, and accepted without questioning that they 
themselves would only be able to purchase a few stocks. They did not demand a 
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right to buy a bigger share, even though this might conceivably make them rich. 
What instead concerned them was whether the benevolent, paternalistic ethos 
would continue as before. Questions at the meeting revolved around personal 
worries over how the buy-out would affect their various perquisites and 
entitlements. The privatization of their enterprise was approved by a show of 
hands without any real discussion or dissent. 
Even after its privatization, the enterprise continued to provide employees and 
retirees with gifts, subsidies and other benefits: the organization-oriented model 
remained alive and well. The distillery did move to implement two major changes, 
though. First, as the distillery prepared to privatize, it sought to eliminate over-
employment by inducing many of the older employees to take early retirement. 
The distillery targeted women over the age of 43 and men over 48, “though if they 
have technical skills they don’t have to go”. Ostensibly, retirement was voluntary, 
but in reality it was not. These early retirements were part of a nationwide 
program for firms that were being restructured or privatized, but the distillery 
insisted on providing higher compensation than necessary. A government 
directive stipulated that the compensation should be 600 yuan for every year of 
prior employment but, as a retiree observed, “our distillery fought for a higher 
sum and provided 1,400 yuan for each year, and a minimum of 10,000 yuan”. In 
addition, the distillery offered a monthly stipend of about 1,000 yuan, plus 
continued access to some of the perquisites they had enjoyed. If they took up new 
employment after their early retirement, moreover, it would not affect their 
stipend and benefits. All the employees we spoke with who had been told to leave 
were more than willing to go. 
The second major change involved the wage system. After the early retirees 
had departed, in 2004 the distillery declared (again in accordance with announced 
government preferences) that wages would no longer in part be determined by 
longevity of employment. Instead, henceforth the rank and post of an employee 
would play a more important role. Even so, what is most noticeable about the new 
wage system adopted in 2004 was that (1) egalitarian bonuses remained in place 
and (2) the salary gap between different types of jobs continued to be quite 
narrow. In addition, to kick off the new system the distillery raised the incomes of 
all of the remaining employees, so as to retain a consensus harmony and feelings 
of “fairness” among the workforce. 
Four-and-a-half years later, in May 2009, the distillery continues to look after 
the workforce in material terms. The year-end bonuses have been retained and, in 
a still-egalitarian mode, all of the workers on the same shop floor continue to 
receive the same amount as their mates. Some of the various small subsidies, such 
as for reading materials and heating, have been dropped within the past couple of 
years; but even earlier in the decade a number of these petty subsidies had already 
been considered a bit odd by all but the oldest employees. Some of the other 
subsidies and gestures of solicitude have remained in place. As one example, the 
distillery provides a 200-yuan monthly subsidy for each retiree to top up the 
retirement benefits that they now receive through government channels, and 
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enterprise leaders continue to host a restaurant banquet for all the retirees at 
Chinese New Year.  
In other ways, too, elements of the previous enterprise model persist. The 
staff and workers representative congress continues to exist, and at its 2009 
sessions it approved new members for the enterprise’s supervisory board and, 
among other things, also designated several employees as labor models. The 
trade union still serves as a welfare arm of the enterprise, and enterprise union 
officials still visit the ill and appraise their needs, organize community activities 
at the national holidays, distribute gifts of good liquor at Chinese New Year and 
participate in funerals. 
At the same time, the distillery management has done very well out of the 
privatization. Through the dividends they enjoy, the gap in income between them 
and ordinary employees has greatly widened. Of the distillery’s net profits in 
2008, 82.5 per cent were distributed as dividends, resulting in a far lower rate of 
reinvestment than in previous times. The enterprise’s general manager—the one 
who was greatly trusted by employees—owns 20 per cent of all the shares, and he 
has very quickly become a very wealthy man. Over the past five years, he has 
received 97,000,000 yuan (US$14,000,000) in dividends. But he is careful to 
remain low-key in his lifestyle, and continues to drive a modest car.47  
To date, other than the huge financial gains of the top managers, the distillery 
has not shifted away greatly from previous practices. In light of this, even though 
the public discourse today in China often assumes that the Anglo–American model 
is best for China, it is not clear that companies like the distillery will evolve in that 
direction. A study of Sino–German joint ventures, for instance, finds that a 
mentality similar to what we described for the distillery persists at these joint-
venture firms, which had previously been state enterprises. Managers there have to 
accommodate employees’ expectations that the workplace is an “enterprise family”, 
that managers should go on home visits when employees fall sick, and that the 
personal matters of even laid-off staff should be well taken care of.48 
Nonetheless, the Chinese government’s implementation of privatization and 
the main thrust of its other policies largely favor the dominance of the Anglo–
American model of capitalism. 49  There is a strong pull in China among the 
managerial/ownership class toward self-enrichment, and it appears that, in the 
service of this, in many of the prosperous former state enterprises and even in 
some of the remaining major state-owned enterprises workers’ conditions are 
being squeezed, their entitlements to job security undermined and the 
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organization-oriented model dismantled. Even so, the overall picture is 
complicated. There are signs that some of the huge state-owned firms have 
retained practices inherited from the past and have given these an organization-
oriented twist—and that an “enterprise culture” persists similar to what we 
discovered when we were at the distillery. 
In several interesting cases, even some private enterprise owners have moved 
on their own initiative to introduce an organization-oriented model into their 
companies. A research project examining private enterprises in Zhejiang Province 
in the late 1990s found that such private firms were usually larger and quite 
profitable. The owners adopted the organization-oriented system as a means to 
cultivate the loyalty of their employees. They paid employees quite generous 
bonuses, provided training for them, and organized social and entertainment 
programs, all in line with the organization-oriented model.50 A more recent study 
conducted by another researcher at a private firm in Zhejiang found an effort to 
cultivate an “enterprise culture” in order to create a collectivist élan, urging 
workers to work hard for the “enterprise family”. In return, workers enjoy above 
average conditions, including, for instance, 3,500 yuan worth of gifts to each 
employee each year, again in line with the organization-oriented style of 
management. 51  At two other large private companies in Zhejiang studied by 
Calvin Chen,52 each with about 15,000 employees, the owners rediscovered the 
usefulness of the Chinese state-enterprise management model after they 
experienced workers’ resistance to their formerly disciplinarian labor regime. At 
both of these private firms, 
Recognizing that profitability could not be earned at the cost of workplace 
peace, enterprise leaders are now in the midst of a new phase … focused 
more on ameliorating social tensions and social distinctions in the 
workplace. First, new paternalistic practices have been adopted, extending 
collective benefits to all members. These benefits often take the form of 
“red envelopes” [containing gifts of money] handed out during chunjie 
(Chinese New Year) … gift items like tea sets, raincoats, and 
umbrellas … as well as more substantial retirement and severance 
packages and, most recently, expanded medical care. Moreover, they have 
moved to redefine membership in the enterprise community. So long as 
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individual members contribute to the well-being of the enterprise, they are 
considered part of the enterprise “family” (p. 18) … This development is 
particularly striking … because it highlights the continuing appeal of 
practices more commonly associated with danwei socialism. This 
program also works at a symbolic level—activities such as speech and 
singing contests and sporting events are designed to reinforce the notion 
that the enterprise is the critical, new locus of identity and interaction 
where the perspectives and behavior of enterprise members can and will 
be reshaped.53 
In these private firms, this effort to focus employees’ loyalty toward the 
enterprise is not, of course, in line with danwei socialism, which was state-
oriented. Rather, it is the organization-oriented model that endeavors to spur 
morale and to retain dedicated employees by creating what the Japanese also refer 
to as an “enterprise family”. The socialist danwei may look similar, and indeed 
these private enterprises are adopting some of the measures that had been 
practiced in danweis. But the essential purpose of these private companies and the 
intended focus of loyalty are entirely different from what had been promoted in 
danwei socialism. So too, danwei-like practices that are actually organization-
oriented can be found today in China’s public-service (shiye =-) institutions, 
such as hospitals, universities and the like. 
Extensive research over the coming years will be needed to reveal whether the 
Chinese-style organization-oriented model survives the restructuring processes 
underway in the state-owned sector, and whether the model survives, too, in the 
privatized state enterprises and in the entirely private sector of China’s economy. 
But the possibilities are clear, in particular at some of the companies that are 
making a reasonable profit and can afford to resist lay-offs and cut-backs in 
employee welfare. The legacy of an “enterprise culture” at the distillery is 
favorable to such an outcome. Path-dependent development may yet lead to the 
persistence of an organization-oriented system “with Chinese characteristics” in at 
least part of the Chinese industrial economy. 
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